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One attrition rate is a scandal. One is a rounding error.

International undergraduate attrition rose from 9.7 per cent in 2018 to 17.4 per cent in 2023, feeding a Senate inquiry and a visa crackdown. Domestic bachelor attrition fell by almost as many points in a single year, 2022 to 2023, and reached nobody.

7 min read8 sources

Key takeaways

  • International undergraduate first-year attrition rose from 9.7 per cent (2018 cohort) to 17.4 per cent (2023 cohort), per the Menzies Research Centre's analysis of Commonwealth data, and has since fed into a national visa-integrity crackdown.
  • Domestic bachelor first-year attrition fell from 14.7 per cent (2022 cohort) to 12.2 per cent (2023 cohort), the most recent year available and a one-year move, not a five-year one, per the Department of Education, published in routine annual tables with no comparable scrutiny.
  • TEQSA's compliance framework already requires every provider to identify and support at-risk students regardless of citizenship, so the attention gap between the two cohorts comes from resourcing and urgency. The rules treat them the same.
  • The student visa refusal rate reached 24.2 per cent in June 2026, up from 7.9 per cent in June 2016 (ABC News, 9 September 2026), while nothing equivalent tracks whether domestic early-support systems caught the domestic improvement or were incidental to it.

Two commencing students left an Australian university in 2023 for the same reason: they stopped attending and never re-enrolled anywhere. If one held a student visa, that departure is now part of a live political argument about visa integrity, one that reached a Senate inquiry the same year and has since been folded into a crackdown that has pushed visa refusal rates to a decade high. If the other was a domestic school leaver, the same departure sits inside a routine government table that almost nobody outside higher education has read. The gap between those two reactions has nothing to do with which student was actually more at risk of leaving. It is a gap in who calculates the number, who is watching for it, and what they intend to do once they have it.

Start with the number that became a scandal. Analysing Commonwealth higher education data, the Menzies Research Centre's January 2026 report, International Student Course-Hopping: University Complicity and Government Inaction, put the national first-year attrition rate for commencing international undergraduates at publicly supported universities at 17.4 per cent in 2023, up from 9.7 per cent in 2018: about 14,873 students who left within twelve months of starting. At Central Queensland University, the report put the institution-level figure at 57.2 per cent, meaning well over half of the international undergraduates who started that year were gone within it. The report's own framing was blunt: the scale, concentration and timing of the departures "strongly suggest" growing misuse of the student visa system, concentrated at lower-cost providers and capital-city branch campuses.

That framing landed in a policy environment already moving hard in the same direction, alongside the report rather than because of it. Ministerial Direction 115, in force from 14 November 2025, put every offshore student visa application through a new three-tier priority system tied to how close a provider sits to its allocated intake. By September 2026, ABC News reported that the student visa refusal rate had climbed to its highest in a decade: from 7.9 per cent in June 2016 to 24.2 per cent in June 2026, with refusal rates as high as 51 per cent for applicants from Nepal and 40 per cent for India, against 5.8 per cent for China. None of that traces back to the Menzies report in a straight line of cause and effect. What it shows is that international attrition, once a think tank had quantified and named it, moved fast from a number in a report to an input into how the government decides who gets a visa at all.

The number that did not become anything

Now the number that did not travel anywhere. Domestic commencing bachelor attrition, the share of local students who start a bachelor's degree and neither complete it nor return the following year, fell from 14.7 per cent for the 2022 commencing cohort to 12.2 per cent for the 2023 cohort, according to the Department of Education's Key findings from the 2024 Higher Education Student Statistics, drawn from the Department's 2024 Section 15 attrition tables. That is a smaller move in percentage points than the international figure (2.5 points against 7.7) but it happened inside a population that is many times larger, which means the raw number of domestic students behind that fall, and the raw number still leaving each year, both dwarf the international undergraduate intake Menzies analysed.

International undergraduate first-year attrition rose from 9.7% in 2018 to 17.4% in 2023, while domestic bachelor attrition fell from 14.7% in 2022 to 12.2% in 2023.

The fall was published in the Department's ordinary annual release. It generated no Senate inquiry, no ministerial direction, no news cycle asking what changed and why. That asymmetry is not evidence that domestic attrition is fine and international attrition is not. Both numbers describe the same underlying event, a first-year student disengaging and not returning, measured on the same one-year logic. What differs is the apparatus behind the number: one was produced by a centre-right think tank with an explicit argument to make about visa policy, published as a named report built for headlines and picked up within weeks by outlets from Canberra press gallery regulars to immigration-law newsletters; the other was one line in a statistical release that exists to be filed, not read aloud.

One compliance standard, two levels of attention

This matters operationally because the regulator does not distinguish between the two cohorts. TEQSA's Higher Education Standards Framework requires every registered provider to monitor students' progress and identify those at risk of not progressing, regardless of citizenship, so the provider can intervene before a student disengages entirely. TEQSA's own Compliance in focus: Identifying students at academic risk guidance names a specific failure mode it has observed across the sector: providers that monitor academic performance adequately but do not act on the signal early enough, so students at risk of not progressing reach the point of discontinuing before anyone intervenes.

Read against that standard, the framing gap becomes a resourcing question rather than a rhetorical one. A provider under public scrutiny for international course-hopping has an obvious incentive to tighten early identification for that cohort specifically, because the political and financial cost of getting it wrong is now visible and immediate: a slow visa queue, a red-zone allocation, a name in the next report. A provider with a quietly improving domestic number has no equivalent pressure to ask whether its early-identification systems caught that improvement or were merely incidental to it. TEQSA's standard does not care which cohort is politically live this year. An early-alert system built to satisfy the loudest complaint is not the same thing as one built to satisfy the standard.

What gets missed when attention follows the scandal

Running early support inside the first six months of enrolment, across both cohorts at once, makes this asymmetry concrete in a way neither dataset shows on its own. A domestic, first-in-family student who stops logging into the learning platform and misses two tutorials in week three produces exactly the same early signal as an international student doing the same thing for the same underlying reasons: an unfamiliar workload, a gap between expectation and reality, no obvious person to ask for help. Nothing about that signal carries a visa status. But the institutional urgency attached to acting on it does, in practice, vary with which story is currently live in Canberra and in the press. A cohort that is the subject of a course-hopping investigation gets manual case review and a name on a dashboard. A cohort that is merely part of a quietly improving national average gets whatever the standing process already does, which is exactly the process nobody outside the institution is currently checking.

That is the actual risk in treating attrition as a scandal that happens to one population rather than a compliance obligation that covers all of them: attention follows the argument, not the risk. A provider can pass every question about international course-hopping and still be running a domestic early-alert process nobody has stress-tested since it was built, simply because nobody outside the institution is currently asking it to.

What the comparison is actually for

None of this argues that international attrition at 17.4 per cent nationally, or 57.2 per cent at one campus, is not a real problem; it plainly is, and the visa-integrity reading is not unreasonable on the numbers Menzies published, whatever you make of the "government inaction" framing in its title. The argument is narrower: a 2.5-point fall inside a first-year population several times the size of the international undergraduate intake is not a footnote just because nobody built a report title around it, and a 7.7-point rise is not automatically the more urgent number just because a think tank got there first. If TEQSA's standard genuinely does not care about citizenship, the attention that decides which early-alert system gets checked should not either. The honest test for any provider is not which cohort made the news this year. It is whether the answer to "how would we know a struggling student before they left" is the same, in practice, for both.

Sources

  1. Menzies Research Centre, International Student Course-Hopping: University Complicity and Government Inaction (January 2026; national and CQUniversity international undergraduate first-year attrition rates, 2018 and 2023 cohorts).
  2. Department of Education, Key findings from the 2024 Higher Education Student Statistics (domestic commencing bachelor attrition, 2022 and 2023 cohorts).
  3. Department of Education, 2024 Section 15: Attrition, Success and Retention (the underlying attrition series and definitions).
  4. Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency, Compliance in focus: Identifying students at academic risk (the Higher Education Standards Framework obligation and the compliance gap TEQSA has observed).
  5. Department of Home Affairs, Ministerial Direction 115 (traffic-light offshore student visa processing, in force from 14 November 2025).
  6. ABC News, Australian student visa refusal rate hits 10-year high amid government crackdown (9 September 2026; refusal rate by year and by country of origin).
  7. Parliament of Australia, Senate Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Universities Accord (Opening the Doors of Opportunity) Bill 2026 (the inquiry in which international student allocation and ministerial discretion were contested).
  8. The Australia Today, More than 14,000 international students left Australian universities within their first year, CQ University recording 57% dropout rate (corroborating coverage of the Menzies Research Centre figures).

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